Condorcet Consistent Bundling with Social Choice

We study the problem of computing optimal bundles given agents' preferences over individual items when agents derive satisfaction from the entire bundle under constraints on the size k of the bundle. Building on the notion of Condorcet winning sets by Gehrlein, we extend common Condorcet consistent voting rules from the single winner voting setting to that of forming bundles of size k. Our main technical contribution involves designing efficient algorithms for computing (approximately)-optimal bundles for multi-winner extensions of the following voting rules: Copeland, Minimax, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze.

Reference

Shreyas Sekar, Sujoy Sikdar, and Lirong Xia, " Condorcet Consistent Bundling with Social Choice,"

Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS) 2017, pp. 33-41

Bibtex

@inproceedings{sekar2017condorcet,
  title={Condorcet consistent bundling with social choice},
  author={Sekar, Shreyas and Sikdar, Sujoy and Xia, Lirong},
  booktitle={Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems},
  pages={33--41},
  year={2017},
  organization={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}
}